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Abstract. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product 
according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. 
In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain 
probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this 
game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the 
technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of 
each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with 
both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the 
own expected production costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Let Fi and F2 be two firms, each producing a differentiated product. Both firms simultaneously choose the price 
for the corresponding good with the purpose to maximize their expected profit. We consider an economic model in 
which we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability 
distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We suppose that firm Fi 's 
unitary production cost is CA with probabihty ^ and CB with probabihty 1 - ^ (where CA > CB), and firm F2's unitary 
production cost is CH with probabihty 9 and CL with probability 1 - 0 (where CH > ci). Both probabihty distributions 
of unitary production costs are common knowledge. In this work, we determine the prices in the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium for the above model, and we analyze the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology 
with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each 
firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases 
with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the 
effect of the own expected production costs. 
THE MODEL AND THE EQUILIBRIUM 
We consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, Fi and F2. Firm Fi produces a substitutable product 
/ at a constant marginal cost, for / G {1,2}. The firms simultaneously choose prices, respectively, pi>0 and p2 > 0. 
The direct demands are given by 
qi = a-pi + bpj, 
where qt stands for quantity, a > 0 is the intercept demand parameter and I7 > 0 is a constant representing how much 
the product of one firm is a substitute for the product of the other. For simplicity, we assume b < I. These demand 
functions are unrealistic in that one firm could conceivably charge an arbitrary high price and stiU have a positive 
demand provided the other firm also charges a high enough price. However, this function is chosen to represent a 
linear approximation to the "true" demand function, appropriate near the usual price settings where the equilibrium is 
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reached. Usually, in the case of complete information, the literature considers firm Ff's profit, Tti, given by 
MPhPj) = GiiPi-c) 
= {a-pi + bpj){pi-c), 
where 0 < c < a is the unitary production cost for both firms. Here, we suppose that each firm has two different 
technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probabihty distribution. The use of either one or the other 
technology affects the unitary production cost. The following probabihty distributions of the firms' production costs 
are common knowledge among both firms: 
_ , CA with probabihty ^ 
^ ' CB with probabihty l-(p ' 
„ _ j CH with probabihty 9 
^ ^ \ CL with probabihty 1 - 0 
We suppose that CA > CB, CH > CL and CA,CB,CH,CL < a. Moreover, we suppose that the highest unitary production 
cost of any firm is greater than the lowest unitary production cost of the other one, that is, CA > CL and CH> CB-
Firms' profits, ni and 112, are given by 
T^i{pi{ci),P2{c2)) = {a-pi{ci) + bp2{c2)){pi{ci)-ci), 
MPlici),P2{C2)) = {a-p2{C2) + bpi{ci)){p2{C2)-C2), 
where the price/),(c,) depends on the unitary production cost c,- of firm Z^ -, for /G {1,2}. 
Theorem 1. Let E{Ci) = ^CA + {I - ^)CB be the expected unitary production cost of firm Fi, and let £{€2) = 
9CH + (1 - d)cL be the expected unitary production cost of firm F2. For the Bertrand model with uncertainty costs 
considered, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is 
iipKcA),pKcB)),iP2icH),P2icL))), 
where 
, , , 2a{2 + b) + {4-b^)cA+b^E{Ci)+2bE{C2) 
PdcA) = ^^^^^2) ' (1) 
, , , 2a{2 + b) + {4-b^)cB + b^E{Ci)+2bE{C2) 
Plies) = ^(^3^2^ , (2) 
, , , 2a{2 + b) + {4-b^)cH + b^E{C2)+2bE{Ci) 
P2{CH) = ^^^3^2^ , (3) 
*, , 2a{2 + b) + {A-b'^)cL + b'^E{C2)+2bE{Ci) 
P2icL) = ^(^3^2^ . (4) 
Proof. If firm Fi 's unitary production cost is high, PI{CA) is the solution of 
max{e{a-pi+bp2icH))ipi-CA) + ii-0){a-pi+bp2icL))ipi-CA)); 
Pl>0 
and if it is low, PI{CB) is the solution of 
max{e{a-pi+bp2icH))ipi-CB) + ii-0){a-pi+bp2icL))ipi-CB))-
Pl>0 
If firm F2's unitary production cost is high, PI{CH) is the solution of 
max{^{a-p2 + bpl{cA)){p2-CH) + {l-^){a-p2 + bp*i{cB)){p2-CH)); 
P2>0 
and if it is low, PI{CL) is the solution of 
max{<j){a-p2 + bpl{cA))ip2-CL) + ii-<l>)ia-p2 + bpl{cB))ip2-CL))-
P2>0 
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Solving these maximization problems, we obtain equalities (l)-(4). 
From this theorem we get Corollaries 1 and 2. 
Corollary 1. The expected price, E{pl), of the good produced by firm Fi is given by 
a{2 + b)+2E{Ci)+bE{C2) 
E{pt 2{4-b^) 
and the expected price, E{pl), of the good produced by firm F2 is given by 
E{P*2) = a{2 + b)+bE{Ci)+2E{C2) 2{4-b^) 
Proof. The expected market prices, E{pl) and £(/?!), of the goods produced by firms Fi and F2 are determined, 
respectively, by E{pl) = PI{CA)<1>+plicB)ii - <l>) and E{p2) = P2icH)6 + P2icL)ii - 6)- Using equalities (l)-(4), 
we get the results. • 
The effect of the probabihties ^ and 9 over the expected prices is shown in Figure 1, for some parameter region of 




FIGURE 1. Expected prices, E{pl) and i?(p|), in the case of: (A) firms producing independent goods (b = 0); and (B) firms 
producing differentiated goods (b = 0.9). Other parameters values: a = 15, c^ =CH = 6, CB = CL = 4. 
Corollary 2. Let V(Q) be the variance of the firm /^'s unitary production cost, for / G {1,2}. Firm Fi 's expected profit 
E{nl) is given by 
E{nt) {a{2 + b)-{2-b^)E{Ci)+bE{C2)) V{Ci) (4 _ 1,2)2 
and firm F2's expected profit £'(;r|) is given by 
E{n^) = 
{a{2 + b)+bE{Ci)-{2-b^)E{C2)) ^(Cz) 
{A-b^f 4 • 
Proof. The results follow by putting the quantities (l)-(4) into the formulas 
E{nt) = 7tiiqUcA),q*2icH))(^e + 7tiiqUcA),q*2icLmil-e) + 
+n,{ql{cB),q*2{cHm-<l>)e + n,{qlicB),q*2{cLm-<l>){l-e) 
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and 
E{n*^) = 7t2iqlicA),q*2icHme + 7t2iqlicA),q*2icL))(^il-e) + 
+n2{qt{cB),q*2{cHm-<l>)e + n2{qt{cB),q*2{cL)){l-<l>){l-
The effect of the probabifities (p and 0 over the firms' expected profits is shown in Figure 2A for the case of 
independent goods (b = 0), and in Figure 2B for the case of differentiated goods (b = 0.9), for some parameter region 
of the model. We see that both firms profit more in the case of differentiated goods than in the case of independent 
goods. 
A B 
FIGURE 2. Firms' expected profits, E{K^) and i?(;r|), in the case of: (A) firms producing independent goods (b = 0); and (B) 
firms producing differentiated goods (b = 0.9). Other parameters values: a = 15, CA=CH = 6, CB = CL = 4. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We showed that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also showed 
that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected 
production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs. 
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